One thing the article doesn’t make very clear is that for 2FA the PIN requirement comes from the site itself. If the site requires User Verification, the PIN is required. If not, it is not prompted even if set and this attack is possible. The response to the site just says they knew it.
It is different for Passkeys. They are stored on the device and physically locked behind the PIN, but this is just an attack on 2FA where the username and password are known. (In depth it’s more than that, but for most people walking around with a Yubikey…)
It also seems limited in scope to the targeted site and not that everything else protected by that specific Yubikey. That limits how useful this is in general, which is another reason it is sort of nation-state level or an extremely targeted attack. It’s not something your local law enforcement are going to use.
I think the YubiHSM is a much more appealing target, but that isn’t so much a consumer device and has its own authentication methods.
One thing the article doesn’t make very clear is that for 2FA the PIN requirement comes from the site itself. If the site requires User Verification, the PIN is required. If not, it is not prompted even if set and this attack is possible. The response to the site just says they knew it.
It is different for Passkeys. They are stored on the device and physically locked behind the PIN, but this is just an attack on 2FA where the username and password are known. (In depth it’s more than that, but for most people walking around with a Yubikey…)
It also seems limited in scope to the targeted site and not that everything else protected by that specific Yubikey. That limits how useful this is in general, which is another reason it is sort of nation-state level or an extremely targeted attack. It’s not something your local law enforcement are going to use.
I think the YubiHSM is a much more appealing target, but that isn’t so much a consumer device and has its own authentication methods.