vegeta@lemmy.world to Technology@lemmy.worldEnglish · 4 days agoHackers can steal 2FA codes and private messages from Android phonesarstechnica.comexternal-linkmessage-square38fedilinkarrow-up1213arrow-down116cross-posted to: android@lemdro.idtechnology@beehaw.org
arrow-up1197arrow-down1external-linkHackers can steal 2FA codes and private messages from Android phonesarstechnica.comvegeta@lemmy.world to Technology@lemmy.worldEnglish · 4 days agomessage-square38fedilinkcross-posted to: android@lemdro.idtechnology@beehaw.org
minus-squareChaosMonkey@lemmy.dbzer0.comlinkfedilinkEnglisharrow-up11·4 days agoThat wouldn’t be too bad. There could be a new permission for precise time.
minus-squareA Basil Plant@lemmy.worldlinkfedilinkEnglisharrow-up6·edit-23 days agoYou can implement a counting-thread that’s even more precise than the CPU’s timer (TSC on x86) platforms. This was shown in attacks on Intel SGX, where the rdtsc instruction to access the time-stamp counter is unavailable. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-60876-1_1 https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.08719 If you remove access to the timer, attackers will simply build one.
minus-squareA Basil Plant@lemmy.worldlinkfedilinkEnglisharrow-up3·edit-23 days ago…and there you go: https://ccs25files.zoolab.org/main/ccsfb/1REOCPAR/3719027.3765061.pdf https://misc0110.net/files/exfilstate_ccs25.pdf From https://www.sigsac.org/ccs/CCS2025/accepted-papers/ (#378) Literally published less than a day ago: ExfilState: Automated Discovery of Timer-Free Cache Side Channels on ARM CPUs At the same conference (CCS) that the paper referred to by the ars technica article was accepted.
That wouldn’t be too bad. There could be a new permission for precise time.
You can implement a counting-thread that’s even more precise than the CPU’s timer (TSC on x86) platforms. This was shown in attacks on Intel SGX, where the rdtsc instruction to access the time-stamp counter is unavailable.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-60876-1_1
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.08719
If you remove access to the timer, attackers will simply build one.
…and there you go:
https://ccs25files.zoolab.org/main/ccsfb/1REOCPAR/3719027.3765061.pdf
https://misc0110.net/files/exfilstate_ccs25.pdf
From https://www.sigsac.org/ccs/CCS2025/accepted-papers/ (#378)
Literally published less than a day ago:
At the same conference (CCS) that the paper referred to by the ars technica article was accepted.