• Web3 developer Brian Guan lost $40,000 after accidentally posting his wallet’s secret keys publicly on GitHub, with the funds being drained in just two minutes.
  • The crypto community’s reactions were mixed, with some offering support and others mocking Guan’s previous comments about developers using AI tools like ChatGPT for coding.
  • This incident highlights ongoing debates about security practices and the role of AI in software development within the crypto community.
  • barsquid@lemmy.world
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    5 months ago

    What’s the general consensus on storing encrypted data in the repo with the keys outside? I see people recommend that but I’m too paranoid and my secrets are very small in size so it hasn’t been necessary.

    • lurch (he/him)@sh.itjust.works
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      5 months ago

      the format of the encrypted file can give the attackers an advantage. if your code reads the decrypted file, the attacker can guess the first line is a comment or the name of a setting. a savvy person can combine that with the algorithm to perform a “known plaintext attack”, for example by generating a number of possible passwords that would lead to files starting like that.

      • barsquid@lemmy.world
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        5 months ago

        That’s smart. Anyone trying that should definitely have a machine-generated strong password!

    • Takios@discuss.tchncs.de
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      5 months ago

      I’ve seen that done for configuration management like Salt or Ansible. The repos for that were always hosted on internal Gitlab instances though.

    • elephantium@lemmy.world
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      5 months ago

      I see some of that in my job. We put encrypted data in settings files, and the keys for decryption are provided on the VMs where we deploy. The developers never actually see the keys.

      I suppose it’s as secure as the process for managing the production VMs, assuming the encryption isn’t just md5!