Given the widespread existence of wasm sandboxing, rustc itself might want to think about alternative strategies for running compiler plugins. I suspect there’d be a performance hit with such an approach, but wasm tooling is getting really good; perhaps it is minor.

Apology appreciated, but unnecessary.

I don’t want to derail a useful tool. It’s worth going a bit beyond “hope” as a strategy, however, and thinking about if (how) this might be exploited.

I doubt anyone will be mining crypto in your sandbox. But perhaps you should think about detection; might it be possible to mask a malicious crate with a second that attempts to detect sandboxed compilation, for instance?

In any case, I think this still looks exceedingly interesting in the typical case, which is of detecting the impact of bugs from non-malicious actors.

I think you’re trying to handwave at someone who knows more about the steganographic watermarking approach than you do.

Given the existence of macros, doesn’t this let package maintainers run arbitrary code in the painter sandbox?

In the UK, she has some claim to shared equity.

I had a small X.25 network as combination coffee-table and space-heater at one point; this was before most homes had internet. It almost cost me a divorce.