It is clear that what the court and private companies intend is to appease and target bigoted demigraphics for purely economic benefits, which the decrease thereof constitutes a “social issue.” We know quite well that in the heart of the European continent, this policy is targeting hijab more so than any other so-called religious symbol. If the authorities genuinely want to prevent “social disputes” they could’ve tackled social inequalities and the discrimination against asylum seekers and refugees, as well as addressing Islamophobia instead of chucking the root problem in the dustbin.

Perhaps liberal Nation-States may not entertain my second argument, but the veil is primarily a cultural element and not a religious symbol. Comparing it to the cross is a bad-faith analogy. The veil in fact predates Islam and was (and is still) present in many civilizations in different forms, including China and India. Its usage was also common in Europe before the 20th century, though now it is pretty much reduced to ceremonials and rituals. Would such a ban on religious symbols include the traditional indian outfits as well?

I am also quite intrigued to know how does a piece of clothing affect the workplace environment. Does removing it automatically imply neutrality? Is this all it takes to deem one “neutral”? And this brings me to ask how exactly does neutrality affect the workplace, should a religious ornament imply otherwise?

And say that veiled women refused to remove their veils, this means that a significant fraction of citizens are subsequently barred from professional and civic activity. How would this marginalization aid the resolution of those “social disputes”?

The neutrality of law enforcing authorities is beyond the scope of this discussion, since the court’s ruling concerns private enterprises.

By your logic, I hear that you actually disagree with the court’s ruling.